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FOREWORD

BIOTERRORISM:

A

POTENTIAL

EXISTENTIAL THREAT

BRIGADIER GENERAL MURRAY G, SAGSVEEN (RET,)*

&
SARAH M, BIRD NELSON**

In 2005, former United States Senate Majority Leader William Frist
claimed that "[t]he greatest existential threat we have in the world today is
biologicaL"i Ycars later, bioterrorism remains a serious threat, creating a
challenging public health, medical, economic, and national security issue
for the United States and other countries across the globe,
Bioterrorism is a form of asymmetrical warfare in which a terrorist,
with biological expertise and modest means, could inflict great harm upon
millions of innocent victims, Asymmetric warfare is a conflict between opponents whose relative power significantly differs, which compels the
weaker opponent to employ unconventional strategies or tactics? The
Minutemen's strategy against the Redcoats-shooting at the snperior British forces from behind trees instead of confronting them in the open-is a
classic early-American example of asymmetric warfare,
The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon are another example of asymmetric warfare, Nineteen young Arab
men-armed only with knives, box cutters, and pepper spray or Macehijacked four planes, "turned them into deadly gnided missiles," and killed
about three thousand innocent office workers, passengers, and aircraft
:~ MUITay G. Sagsveen is the general counsel of the American Academy of Neurology, an
international specialty medical society. Previously, he was chief executive officer of the North
Dakota Department of Health, the Army National Guard Special Assistant to The Judge Advocate
General of the Army, and a partner in a Bismarck, ND., law finn.
** Sarah M. Bird Nelson is a staff attomey for the American Academy of Neurology. She
graduated from the University of Sl. Thomas School of Law in 2009 and served as an articles
editor for the Law Journal during the 2008-09 academic year.
I. MILTON LEITENBERG, ASSESSING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND BrOTERRORlSM THREAT

1 (2005),
2. See Andrew J. R. Mack, Why Big Nations Lme Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric
Conflict, WORLD POL., Jan. 1975, at 175-200.
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crew. 3 In addition, one publicly-supportcd nonprofit organization estimated
that the economic loss from property damage, lost production of goods and
services, and loss in stock market wealth approached $2 trillion 4
What would be the impact if terrorists employed biological agents instead of hijacked aircraft? On October 15,2001, a letter containing anthrax
spores was opened in the Hart Senate Office Building in Washington, D.C.
The one letter impacted staff (about thirty congressional employees tested
positive for anthrax exposure) and caused the closure of the Hart Building
and several other government buildings along the mail delivery route and
elsewhere. The cleanup costs to the Environmental Protection Agency were
$27 million.s The Hart Building did not reopen until January 23, 2002.
Instead of a non-contagious biological agent such as antill'ax, what if
terrorists employed a contagious biological agent" An m'ticle in the New
England Journal of Medicine explains how quickly the SARS epidemic
raced around the globe in 2003:
In terms of sheer drama, the emergence of the sevcre acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) rivaled the most exotic Michael Crichton
thriller. A novel viral strain spread in "wet markets" from an obscure animal to food handlers; through a rural province in southern China; to Hong Kong by way of an ill Chinese physician who
had traveled to attend a wedding; and in one night at a Hong
Kong hotel, from that man to at least 12 other people. These 12
returned to their five home countries and created multiple chains
of transmissions that, over the course of the next four months, led
to more than 8000 cases of SARS, resulting in almost 800 deaths
in 27 countries, representing every continent. 6
Toronto provides an example of the devastating impacts of even a brief
epidemic on a city. A 14-week epidemic in the city triggered quarantine
measures for 30,000 persons who may have been exposed, closure of facilities, and the issuance of international travel advisories by the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC). Ontario identified 375 probable SARS cases, and 44 ultimately
died. Toronto also suffered an estimated $1 billion economic loss due to

3. The 9111 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, http://www.91lcommission.gov/reportJ911ReporcExcc.htm (last

visited Dec. 2, 2009).
4. Institute for the Analysis of Global SccLllity, How Much Did the September J1 Terrorist
Attack Cost America?, http://www.iags.org/costof911.htmi(last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
5, U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF. REP. TO THE CHAIRMAN, CO:v[M1TTEE ON Fl:--<., U.S. SENATE, CAPI·
TOL HILL ANTHRAX INCIDENT:

EPA's CLEANUP
(2003).

WAS SUCCESSfUL; OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO

EN·

HANCE CONTRACT OVERSIGHT 2

6. Robert A, Weinstein, PlwlIIil1gfor Epidemics-The Lessolls ofSARS, NEW
June 3, 2004, at 2332.
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lost jobs, the cancellation of nine city-wide conventions, and travel
advisories. 7
Bioterrorism clearly creates an extremely complicated public health,
medical, and legal environment. Lethal, contagious pathogcns could be released in a city without warning, which would overtax the public health and
medical infrastructure, create local panic, involve law enforcement to detect
and prosecute the perpetrators, and possibly trigger national and international restrictions to limit the spread of the epidemic.
The articles in this symposium publication illustrate the interconnected
and complex nature of the issues surroundi~g a bioten-orist attack. Representing legal, scientific, and military backgrounds, the authors collectively
offer a comprehensive picture of what is-or at least should be-involved
in preparing for and responding to such attacks.
Keynote speaker Dr. Victoria Sutton, director of the Center for Biodefense, Law and Public Policy at Texas Tech University School of Law,
analyzes the regulatory system governing biodefense research. Professor
Sutton examines the historical development of the select agent rules, the
legal consequences for violating them, and how they have affected the biodefense research community. Specifically, she discusses how biological
agent regulation in the United States has increased over the past two decades in response to incidents like the anthrax attacks in 2001, closing the
gap between the criminal intent to use or attempt to use biological weapons
and mere possession of select agents.' Noting that this heavily regulated
environment can overburden scientific researchers and, in turn, thwart
biodefense advancements, she observes a resulting tension between two legitimate concerns: "The culture of the research scientist and the implementation of [select agent] regulatory mechanisms have led to a clash of
interests-those of research for humankind and those of national seeurity."9
She argues that the United States can arrive at a more balanced regulatory
system if it shifts away from focusing primarily on select agents and how to
control them through performance- or standards-based regulation-i.e., its
current nonnative approach, riddled with loose guidance and dangerous exceptions-and instead focuses on other players, like the facilities that host
the select agents and the individuals who handle them. Public health and
safety and national security, she maintains, should be the regulatory driving
forces. 10 While she admits that these dual goals give rise to an unavoidable

7. GENE MATTHEW::;, THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE RESPONSE TO SUDDEN DISEASE Ol'TBREAK 4
(2005).
8. Victoria Sunon, The Culture of Science find the Regulation and Litigation of Biodefense
Research, 6 U. ST. THOMAS LI 523, 526-27 (2009),
9. [d. at 525.
10. [d. at 547.
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tension, she also points out that careful consideration of this tension can
provide useful insights to lawmakers, regulators, and legal academicians. 11
Professor Barry Kellman and Zachary Clopton, president and former
research fellow of the International Security & Biopolicy Institute, respectively, consider international anti-bioviolence initiatives to promote medical
counter-measure (MCM) preparedness. Their decision to foclls on MCM
preparedness stems from the notion that the ready availability and proper
dissemination of MCMs can help contain the negative effects of bioterrorist
incidents and, in turn, deter attacks.12 In addition, MCM preparedness engages the international community, which, Kellman and Clopton contend, is
critical to successful response efforts since bioviolencc is a global concern
that demands global cooperation and collaboration. 13 They highlight some
of the major legal challenges implicated in developing an effective international MCM preparedness strategy and suggest ways to address them. Kellman and Clopton identify risk assessment and management as the first
hurdle to overcome in the MCM planning process and discuss the possibility of creating an international task force to handle such preparedness efforts. 14 Next, they explore the current lack of incentive to conduct MCM
research and development. Recognizing that the costly, time-consuming,
and risky nature of MCM research and development discourages drug manufacturers from engaging in it, they consider liability protection and patent
right clarification as mechanisms to counter this reality,l."; Kellman and

Clopton then turn to MCM licensing and emergency approval, arguing that
this legal roadblock can be averted if national and international licensing
standards and regulations are determined before a bioviolence crisis occurs. 16 FinallY, they consider MCM stockpiling and delivery planning; they
posit that MCMs will only be valuable if rapidly delivered to bioviolence
victims when needed and outline ways to .make this possible. 17
Professors R. Gregory Evans and Rachel D. Schwartz of Saint Louis
University School of Public Health's Institute for Biosecurity, discuss
"preparedness and response paralysis"-what they define as "the point
many planners reach where they find themselves lacking the resources, support, information, and leadership necessary to continue developing a concrete and actionable plan that can be implemented in the face of a particular
type of disastel'''-and the factors that contribute to it, in the context of the
11. Id. at 548.

12. Barry Kellman & Zachary D, Clopton, A
slIre Preparednen Against Biol'ivlencl!, 6 U. ST.
13. Id. at 555,558-59.
14. hi. at 563-66.
15. Id. aI566-72.
16. Id. at 573-81.
17. Id. at 582-91.

Glohal Architecture j()f MediclI[ CVllllfef-MC'uTHOMAS
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U.S. public health system. 18 They claim that bioterrorism is an area of particular concern to the nation's public health system when it comes to
preparedness, owing in part to the accessibility of biological agents and the
devastating harm they can inflict. 19 Because the consequences of being underprepared are so grave, they argue that i~ is critical to develop a planning
mechanism that overcomes the obstacles bioterrorism planners and responders (and pandemic planners and responders in general) presently encounter. 20 They see the current structure of the U.S. public health system as
one of the primary obstacles to effective preparedness efforts and suggest
ways to develop a more streamlined system. 2 ! They also view the lack of a
process for decision-making in the public health sphere as a significant
roadblock to successful response planning; a fair and transparent process,
they contend, will facilitate critical decision-making and circumvent the paralysis that currently plagues preparation efforts 22
Professor Kavita M. Berger of the Center for Science, Technology and
Security Policy at the American Association of the Advancement of Science, describes the role of science and scientists in bioterrorism preparedness and response efforts. Berger points out that scientists are responsible
for accurately recognizing the symptoms of a disease, identifying the causative agents, and helping mount appropriate and timely public health responses to biological incidents. 23 She also notes that scientists'
development of medical countermeasures (e.g., vaccines) is a critical component of biodefense preparedness and resJonse efforts, while touching on
the legal and ethical challenges inherent in the research and development
and dissemination processes. On the international security and biosafety
front, Berger states that scientists throughout the world participate in important policy discussions about oversight and education regarding dual-use
research-research that is generally legitimate and beneficial but which
could be misapplied for malicious purposes?4 While she recognizes the
concerns that gave rise to U.S. programs and policies intended to combat
nefarious uses, she warns that such protective efforts can, in fact, greatly
hamper our nation's ability to help identify and respond to global public
health threats. 25 Echoing Professor Sutton, Berger argues that U.S. bioterrorism planning efforts should involve examining the impact of U.S. security policies on national security, scientific advancement, and public health,
18. R. Gregory Evans & Rachel D. Schwartz, Preparedness and Response Paralysis: Ramifications for Pandemic Planning, 6 U. ST. THOMAS LJ. 594, 595 (2009).
19. ld. at 596-604.
20. ld. at 604-06, 609-15.
21. ld. at 615-20.
22. ld. at 620-21.
23. Kavita Marfatia Berger, The Role of Science In Preparedness and Response, 6 U. ST.
THOMAS L.!. 622, 623-26 (2009).
24. ld. at 626-33, 644-45.
25. ld. at 634-45.
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as well as attempt to build an effective working relationship between the
security and scientific communities?6
Lieutenant Colonel Larry A. Shireley, Commander of the 81st National Guard Civil Support Team (CST) Dased out of North Dakota, discusses the role CSTs play in preparing for and responding to bioterrorist
attacks. Shireley underscores the importance of CSTs in the bioterrorism
landscape by noting that they are designed specifically to supply 2417 support to civilian first responders reacting to WMD terrorist attacks?7 If a
state is attacked by a bioterrorist, for example, and the state's first responders' assessment reveals that they need more assistance, the state's coordinating official can deploy a CST. Once deployed, Shireley explains, CSTs
can further assess suspected biological events, help identify the biological
agents, advise civilian responders about proper response actiuns, and facilitate requests for additional state and federal assistance through the coordination of their command, operations, administration/logistics,
communications, medical, and survey sections 28 Shireley concludes that if
the United States is subject to a biological terrorist attack in the future,
CSTs will be prepared to effectively respond to it 29
Though biological agents are literally microscopic in size, the reality
that terrorists could use them to inflict harm far greater in magnitude makes
bioterrorism a topic worthy of reflection. The following collection of articles will assist the reader with this endeavor, as it considers the subject
from a variety of angles. Just as our society is multifaceted, so too should
be our approach to an issue that could affect it so profoundly. So, one might
reflect, are we ready for a bioterrorist attack? While historical experience
and recent reports suggest that, as a nation, we still have work to do, engaging in serious discussions about the legal, ethical, and practical issues surrounding bioterrorism preparation and response efforts is certainly an
important step in the right direction.

26. lei. at 646.
27. Lt. Col. Larry A. Shire!ey, National Guard CiI'i! Support Temlls: A 24/7 Response to
Weopolls of Mm's Destruction, 6 U, ST. Tflotl-'!AS LJ. 647, 648~50 (2009).
28. Id. at 650-57.
29. See id. at 657.

